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n recent years, a growing number of states have restructured their 
evidence codes to emulate the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).1  
When Illinois adopted the federal model for the first time in the fall of 
2010,2 the total number of states following the basic structure of the 
FRE increased to forty-three.3  Only California, the District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and 
Virginia have organized their evidence rules in a manner distinct from 
the basic framework of the FRE.4 
Typically states borrow about ninety percent of the language in the 
FRE.5  These states follow the macro-level structure of the FRE, but 
they adapt individual rules to suit local preferences.6  In Oregon, 
approximately twenty-four individual rules depart significantly from 
their federal counterparts.7  The similarities between the Oregon 
Evidence Code (OEC) and the FRE are more noteworthy than the 
differences.8  Indeed, the appellate courts in Oregon rely extensively 
 
1 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
2 On September 27, 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted an evidence code 
modeled after the FRE.  The newly adopted evidence rules in Illinois are very similar to 
their federal counterparts in both format and substance.  For the new rules, commentary, 
and order of approval, see ILLINOIS RULES OF EVIDENCE, COMMITTEE COMMENTARY 
(2010), available at http://www.illinoislawyernow.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09 
/Evidence.pdf. 
3 6 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1 (indicating—in an analysis that apparently 
preceded the update in Illinois—that forty-two states have followed the FRE model). 
4 Id.  In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has adopted the Massachusetts 
Guide to Evidence, which follows the framework of the FRE, but is not an evidence code.  
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON MASS. EVIDENCE LAW, 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts 
/sjc/guide-to-evidence/massguidetoevidence.pdf. 
5 While no scholar has quantified the extent to which states’ evidence codes track the 
federal template, a cursory glance at the similarities suggests that approximately ninety 
percent of the language in most states’ codes derives from the FRE. 
6 See 6 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1 (detailing differences between the FRE and 
various states’ codes). 
7 For a detailed analysis of these provisions, see infra Part I. 
8 Approximately half of the provisions in the OEC are virtually identical to the 
corresponding provisions in the FRE.  E.g., OR. EVID. CODE 103–104 (procedure for 
admitting evidence); OR. EVID. CODE 201 (judicial notice); OR. EVID. CODE 401–403 
(weighing relevance versus prejudice); OR. EVID. CODE 407–412 (policy-based exclusions 
of otherwise relevant evidence); OR. EVID. CODE 601–606 (eligibility rules for witnesses); 
OR. EVID. CODE 611–615 (procedure for examining witnesses); OR. EVID. CODE 701–705 
(expert witnesses); OR. EVID. CODE 801 (definition of hearsay); OR. EVID. CODE 901–903 
(authentication); OR. EVID. 1001–1008 (best evidence doctrine). 
I
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on federal court decisions as persuasive authority in interpreting the 
OEC.9 
The trend toward uniformity in state evidence codes will likely 
build momentum if the U.S. Supreme Court approves the “restyled” 
version of the FRE as expected in May 2011.10  This approval will 
culminate a five-year effort to simplify the FRE without changing the 
substantive meaning of the rules.11  The restyled FRE will provide a 
more attractive template for the states, and it may help to win over 
converts among state legislators and judges who disliked the turgid 
language of the old FRE. 
The restyling coincides with increasing pressures on states to adopt 
standardized rules of evidence.  The states’ economies are growing 
more interdependent.  Legal practice is more likely than ever to 
extend across state lines.12  The number of pro se litigants is 
growing,13 and they are demanding straightforward, standardized 
 
9 Stephanie Midkiff, Oregon Law & Practice: A New Practitioners’ Tool, OR. ST. B. 
BULL., July 2004, at 25, 28, available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/04jul 
/practice.html (“Because the Oregon Evidence Code is based on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, it follows that federal case law plays a huge part in the interpretation of the 
Oregon Code.”).  On April 15, 2011, a search of the OR-CS database of Westlaw yielded 
147 results in response to the following query: “fre” (federal /2 rule /2 evidence) “fed. r. 
evid.”  Given the paucity of evidence decisions by Oregon appellate courts, the frequency 
with which the Oregon courts cite the FRE is striking. 
10 In August 2009, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure released the 
entire package of draft amendments for public comment under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).  The deadline for public comment was February 16, 2010.  
Judicial committees are now reviewing the draft rules, and the Supreme Court will decide 
by May 1, 2011, whether to issue the amendments.  Absent any intervention by Congress, 
the restyled FRE would take effect on December 1, 2011.  The restyling of the FRE would 
not have been possible without the able leadership of Daniel Capra, Reed Professor of Law 
at Fordham Law School, who has served as Reporter for the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence since 1996. 
11 ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, MINUTES OF THE MEETING 12 (2006), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books 
/Evidence/EV2006-04.pdf (initiating the project to restyle the FRE); Memorandum from 
Robert L. Hinke, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, 
Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (May 12, 2008), available at 
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/07-July/Ad%20CommEvidMay2008.pdf (setting 
forth standards for restyling, which provide that the Committee should generally avoid 
proposing substantive changes to FRE). 
12 Trippe S. Fried, Licensing Lawyers in the Modern Economy, 31 CAMPBELL  L. REV. 
51, 52 (2008) (noting the increasing prevalence of interstate practice). 
13 Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 439, 443 (2009) (discussing the rise in pro se litigation); Nina Inger 
VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se 
Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 988 (2007) (noting that federal and state courts 
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rules.  Indeed, the time is ripe for uniform acceptance of the restyled 
FRE.14 
Yet, chances are good that Oregon will buck the trend and resist 
the wholesale adoption of the restyled FRE, at least in the near term.  
Oregon is a maverick state.15  Oregon was slow to adopt national 
templates in other areas of the law such as civil procedure16 and legal 
ethics.17  Led by politicians who proudly proclaim that they are “as 
independent as Oregon,”18 this state is unlikely to track national 
trends simply for the sake of conformity.  Oregon legislators will 
 
“have seen significant increases in the number of self-represented civil litigants in recent 
years”). 
14 Several authors have discussed the benefits of uniformity in evidence law.  See, e.g., 
Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of 
Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 260 (1984) (discussing the benefits of the FRE); 
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Quality of Practice in 
Federal Courts, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 173, 181 (1978) (arguing that uniformity improves 
practice by lawyers, decisions by judges, and the overall quality of the law); Kenneth 
Williams, Do We Really Need the Federal Rules of Evidence?, 74 N.D. L. REV. 1, 5–7 
(1998) (summarizing arguments in favor of uniformity).  But see Paul F. Kirgis, A 
Legisprudential Analysis of Evidence Codification: Why Most Rules of Evidence Should 
Not Be Codified—But Privilege Law Should Be, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 813–31 (2004) 
(criticizing the arguments for uniformity in the evidence rules). 
15 Tom Bates & Mark O’Keefe, Suicide Law Reflects Oregon Politics: Voters Tend to 
Be Quirky But Consistent in Maverick State, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 21, 1994, 
at 3E (discussing Oregon’s notorious independent streak); see also Tom Lininger, Should 
Oregon Adopt the New ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct?, 39 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 1031, 1031–32 (2003) (noting various ways in which Oregon’s laws and rules have 
departed from the national norm). 
16 The Restyled Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in 2007, but as of May 12, 
2011, the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure have incorporated very few of the provisions in 
the restyled federal rules.  Compare OR. R. CIV. P., available at http://www.leg.state 
.or.us/ors/orcpors.htm, with RESTYLED FED. R. CIV. P., available at http://www.uscourts 
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Prelim_draft_proposed_pt1.pdf. 
17 The ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, and 
Oregon adopted this code in 1971.  See In re Porter, 320 Or. 692, 702 n.8, 890 P.2d 1377, 
1383 (1995) (en banc).  In 1983, the ABA discarded the Model Code and replaced it with 
the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.  Oregon waited an astounding twenty-two 
years to adopt the ABA Model Rules.  Order Adopting Oregon Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Order No. 04-044 (2004), available at http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us 
/RULE80.htm.  Even then, Oregon did not adopt the interpretative comments that 
accompanied the ABA Model Rules. 
18 U.S. Representative Peter DeFazio of Oregon’s Fourth District has long insisted that 
he is “as independent as Oregon.”  E.g., As Independent As Oregon, PETER DEFAZIO FOR 
CONGRESS, http://www.defazioforcongress.org/ (last visited May 17, 2011).  U.S. Senator 
Ron Wyden campaigned for reelection in 2010 with this slogan: “Different.  Like 
Oregon.”  Steve Law, Oregon Voters Not as Angry, PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 21, 2010, 
http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=128761184777815000 (noting 
Wyden’s use of this slogan). 
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carefully evaluate whether the restyled FRE are a good fit for the 
state’s unique legal system, not whether the new rules work well 
elsewhere. 
This essay explores whether Oregon should adopt the restyled 
FRE, and if so, to what extent.  Part I analyzes the most important 
differences between the present versions of the OEC and the FRE.  
(This Part may be useful to students who need to memorize the 
unique features of the OEC in order to prepare for the Oregon Bar 
Exam.)  Part II considers the primary reasons why the Oregon rules 
have departed from the federal model over the last few decades.  Part 
III explores the advantages of adopting the restyled federal rules.  Part 
IV addresses the disadvantages of importing the restyled rules in the 
OEC.  Part V suggests one possible compromise that would preserve 
the distinctive character of the OEC while benefiting from the 
improvements to the FRE. 
I 
THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF OREGON’S EVIDENCE CODE 
The OEC has diverged from the FRE in several respects.  Some of 
these differences reflect deliberate policy judgments in 1981, when 
Oregon first considered the FRE and the closely related Uniform 
Rules of Evidence as models for Oregon’s code.19  Other differences 
are attributable to the timing of federal amendments since 1981; 
Oregon does not systematically update its evidence code to 
incorporate every new addition to the FRE, so federal rules added 
after 1981 do not always appear in the OEC.20 
 
19 See Charles Steringer, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 76 OR. L. REV. 173, 181 n.52 
(1997) (indicating that, in 1981, Oregon joined thirty-six other states in adopting evidence 
codes patterned after the FRE); see also Dara Loren Steele, Expert Testimony: Seeking an 
Appropriate Admissibility Standard for Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions, 48 DUKE L.J. 932, 950 n.98 (1999) (noting that Oregon is among the states 
that adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence in whole or in part). 
20 For example, Oregon did not adopt a version of the “Hinckley Rule,” FRE 704(b), the 
limitation on expert testimony that Congress adopted in 1984 after John Hinckley won a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in his trial for attempting to assassinate President 
Ronald Reagan.  Oregon never added a counterpart to FRE 415, which Congress approved 
in 1994 to allow propensity evidence in civil suits for sexual assault and child abuse.  
Oregon waited nearly a decade to adopt a version of the federal forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
rule, FRE 804(b)(6), which took effect in 1997; the Oregon Legislature added analogous 
rules, OEC 804(3)(f) and (g), in 2005.  Oregon has not yet adopted a version of the federal 
privilege-waiver rule, FRE 502, which took effect in 2009. 
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Whether the uniqueness of the OEC is purposeful or accidental, it 
is noteworthy in about twenty-four provisions.  A summary of these 
provisions appears below.  An explanation of the reasons for the 
distinctiveness of the OEC appears in Part II. 
List of presumptions.  While the FRE do not address presumptions 
from a substantive standpoint, OEC 311 lists a total of twenty-six 
presumptions, ranging from the presumption of intentionality (“A 
person intends the ordinary consequences of a voluntary act.”)21 to 
the dead man’s presumption (“A person not heard from in seven years 
is dead.”).22 
Effect of a presumption in a criminal prosecution.  OEC 309 
emphasizes that the judge shall not direct the jury to find a presumed 
fact against the accused.23 
Propensity evidence.  OEC 404 generally mirrors FRE 404, except 
that a striking exception appears in OEC 404(4): propensity evidence 
is admissible in criminal cases if it is simply relevant.24  OEC 404(4) 
indicates that relevant propensity evidence is still excludable in 
criminal cases pursuant to federal or state constitutional law, or 
pursuant to the policy exclusions in OEC 406–412,25 which are 
similar to their federal counterparts.26 
Pattern of abuse.  In civil or criminal cases, OEC 404-1 allows 
evidence showing a pattern of abuse.  Expert testimony on such abuse 
is also admissible.27 
Rape shield law.  OEC 412 gives greater protection to 
complainants than does its federal counterpart.  FRE 412 allows the 
defendant to introduce evidence of his prior consensual sex with the 
complainant;28 OEC 412, by contrast, allows such evidence only 
when necessary to show bias or motive on the part of the 
 
21 OR. EVID. CODE 311(1)(a). 
22 OR. EVID. CODE 311(1)(s). 
23 OR. EVID. CODE 309. 
24 OR. EVID. CODE 404(4). 
25 Id. 
26 Compare id. with FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  Given the breadth of OEC 404(4), it is not 
surprising that Oregon lacks analogs of FRE 413 and 414, which allow propensity 
evidence in prosecutions involving allegations of sexual assault and child molestation.  
Oregon does not have any equivalent of FRE 415, however, which allows propensity 
evidence in civil suits of sex assault and child molestation.  OEC 404(4) does not extend to 
such evidence because it applies only in criminal cases; OEC 404-1 applies to evidence 
showing a pattern of abuse, but this provision is not as broad as FRE 415. 
27 OR. EVID. CODE 404-1. 
28 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B). 
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complainant.29  OEC 412 goes further than FRE 412 in excluding 
opinion or reputation evidence concerning the complainant’s past 
sexual behavior, and in excluding evidence suggesting that the 
complainant’s clothes invited the defendant’s advances.30 
List of privileges.  While the FRE do not enumerate privileges, 
OEC 503–510 list several: the lawyer-client privilege,31 the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege,32 the physician-patient privilege,33 
the nurse-patient privilege,34 the school employee-student privilege,35 
the social worker-client privilege,36 the spousal privilege,37 the 
clergy-penitent privilege,38 the counselor-client privilege,39 the 
stenographer-employer privilege,40 the interpreter privilege,41 and the 
informer privilege,42 among others. 
Exception for future violent crime.  OEC 504-5 allows a lawyer to 
reveal his client’s intent to commit a crime involving physical 
injury.43  By contrast, the federal crime-fraud exception allows 
revelation of such information only when the client intends to commit 
a crime or fraud and the client is seeking to use the lawyer’s services 
in furtherance of that crime or fraud.44 
Prohibition of comments on privileges.  OEC 513 prohibits lawyers 
from commenting to the jury about whether a witness has invoked a 
privilege.45 
 
29 OR. EVID. CODE 412(2)(b)(A). 
30 OR. EVID. CODE 412(1)(b) (barring “reputation or opinion evidence presented for the 
purpose of showing that the manner of dress of an alleged victim of the crime incited the 
crime or indicated consent to the sexual acts alleged in the charge”). 
31 OR. EVID. CODE 503. 
32 OR. EVID. CODE 504. 
33 OR. EVID. CODE 504-1. 
34 OR. EVID. CODE 504-2. 
35 OR. EVID. CODE 504-3. 
36 OR. EVID. CODE 504-4. 
37 OR. EVID. CODE 505. 
38 OR. EVID. CODE 506. 
39 OR. EVID. CODE 507. 
40 OR. EVID. CODE 508a. 
41 OR. EVID. CODE 509-1, 509-2. 
42 OR. EVID. CODE 510. 
43 OR. EVID. CODE 504-5. 
44 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989) (interpreting the crime-fraud 
exception under federal law).  
45 OR. EVID. CODE 513(2). 
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Qualification of a juror to testify.  Both OEC 606 and FRE 606 
prohibit a juror from testifying in the very trial in which she is serving 
as a juror.  FRE 606 goes further, disqualifying a juror from testifying 
in a hearing concerning the jury’s deliberations in the first trial.46  
OEC 606 does not include this restriction on subsequent testimony.47 
Cross-examination of a witness about a specific unconvicted act.  
FRE 608(b) allows a cross-examining attorney to impeach with 
evidence of a specific unconvicted act bearing on truthfulness, so long 
as the attorney takes the answer of the witness.48  OEC 608 is much 
more restrictive.  Under Oregon’s version, an attorney may not even 
elicit intrinsic evidence (i.e., admissions on cross) regarding a specific 
unconvicted act bearing on truthfulness.49  In other words, Oregon 
lawyers generally need to impeach with convictions, not with 
unconvicted acts. 
Time limit for convictions.  OEC 609 allows impeachment with a 
conviction that is up to fifteen years old.50  The time limit under FRE 
609 is ten years.51 
Impeachment of the accused with a prior act of domestic abuse.  In 
prosecutions alleging violent crimes against household members, 
OEC 609 allows the government to impeach with misdemeanor 
convictions involving domestic violence, menacing, or harassment—
even if these misdemeanors did not involve any sort of deceit.52 
Impeachment with evidence of bias.  OEC 609-1 specifically 
authorizes impeachment with evidence of bias.  A subpoint of OEC 
609-1 forbids additional evidence of bias after the impeached witness 
has fully admitted his bias.53  The federal impeachment rules do not 
directly address bias, although evidence of bias is generally 
admissible under FRE 401.54 
No rule authorizing the court to call a witness.  The OEC has no 
counterpart to FRE 614,55 which allows the judge to call and 
interrogate a witness. 
 
46 FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
47 OR. EVID. CODE 606. 
48 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
49 See OR. EVID. CODE 608(2). 
50 OR. EVID. CODE 609(3)(a). 
51 FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 
52 OR. EVID. CODE 609(2)(a). 
53 OR. EVID. CODE 609-1(2). 
54 See FED. R. EVID. 401. 
55 FED. R. EVID. 614. 
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No “Hinckley rule.”  Oregon lacks a version of FRE 704(b), which 
prohibits experts from opining on whether the accused had the 
requisite mens rea to commit the charged offense.56  Congress added 
this provision to the FRE in 1984 after John Hinckley won a verdict 
of not guilty by reason of insanity in his prosecution for attempting to 
assassinate President Ronald Reagan.  OEC 704 allows an expert 
witness to opine about the ultimate issue in any case, including a 
criminal case.57 
No rule authorizing the appointment of an expert on the court’s 
own motion.  The OEC has no version of FRE 706, which allows the 
judge to select and appoint an expert witness on the judge’s own 
initiative. 
Deposition in the same case is exempted from the hearsay 
definition.  Under OEC 801(4)(c), the definition of hearsay does not 
extend to a deposition taken in the same proceeding in order to 
preserve the testimony of a witness expected to be absent at trial.58 
No hearsay exception for present sense impression.  Oregon chose 
not to include a hearsay exception along the lines of FRE 803(1), 
which admits statements that immediately describe perception. 
Hearsay exception for a complaint of child abuse or elder abuse.  
OEC 803(18a)59 allows such hearsay statements if the declarant is 
available for cross-examination or, when the declarant is unavailable, 
if the statement bears sufficient indicia of reliability under a multi-
factor test reminiscent of the reliability analysis pursuant to Ohio v. 
Roberts.60  The rule includes a fifteen-day notice requirement.61 
 
56 FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
57 See OR. EVID. CODE 704 (adopting the language and legislative history of FRE 704). 
58 OR. EVID. CODE 801(4)(c). 
59 OR. EVID. CODE 803(18a). 
60 In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court developed a two-part test for the admissibility of 
hearsay offered against the accused.  448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).  One component of the 
test focused on the availability of the declarant, and the other component focused on the 
reliability of the evidence.  Id.  In interpreting the reliability prong of the Roberts test, 
subsequent rulings examined a list of circumstances similar to the list appearing in OEC 
803(18a)(b).  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–65 (2004) (listing various factors 
considered by courts applying the reliability test under Roberts).  While Crawford 
overruled Roberts, several states such as Oregon have not eliminated language in their 
evidence statutes memorializing the Roberts criteria.  E.g., Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 
39 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (discussing the prevalence of “tender years statutes” that 
require assessment of reliability using Roberts standards and listing examples of such 
statutes); Wesley Fain, The Constitutionality of Alabama’s Tender Years Statute After 
Crawford, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 919, 919–20 (2010). 
61 OR. EVID. CODE 803(18a)(a). 
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Procedure for remote testimony by a vulnerable witness.  OEC 
803(24) sets forth guidelines for a young child or developmentally 
disabled witness to testify from a remote location via closed-circuit 
television.  An expert must demonstrate that the witness in question is 
substantially likely to suffer severe emotional or psychological harm 
if required to testify in open court.62  Oregon has basically 
memorialized the requirements of Maryland v. Craig63 in an evidence 
rule. 
Hearsay exception for a statement narrating domestic abuse.  OEC 
803(26) admits statements purporting to describe domestic violence, 
if the statement was recorded or made to a police officer, an 
emergency responder, or certain other categories of government 
employees.64  This rule includes a reliability requirement that imports 
some of the Roberts jurisprudence.65 
Broader hearsay exception for a dying declaration.  While FRE 
804(b)(2) allows dying declarations only in homicide prosecutions 
and civil trials,66 OEC 804(3)(b) allows dying declarations in all 
categories of trials, including criminal prosecutions alleging crimes 
other than homicide.67 
Hearsay exception for a statement made in a professional capacity.  
OEC 804(3)(e) admits a hearsay statement concerning observations 
made in the declarant’s professional capacity and in the ordinary 
course of professional conduct, so long as the statements are at or 
near the time of the observations.68 
Broader hearsay exception for forfeiture by wrongdoing.  OEC 
804(3)(f) and (g) are significantly broader than FRE 804(b)(6).  
Oregon’s version of the doctrine allows a hearsay statement if the 
 
62 OR. EVID. CODE 803(24). 
63 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) (holding that the “State’s interest in the physical and 
psychological well-being of child abuse victims [was] sufficiently important to outweigh   
. . . a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court” if denial of this face-to-face 
confrontation was necessary to protect the accuser from “emotional trauma”). 
64 OR. EVID. CODE 803(26)(a)(A). 
65 OR. EVID. CODE 803(26)(a)(B); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65–66; see also supra note 60. 
66 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
67 OR. EVID. CODE 803(3)(b).   Most states limit the dying declaration exception to civil 
cases and homicide prosecutions, but a few states follow Oregon’s approach and admit this 
evidence in every category of case.  E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 2011); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-25-119 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(e) (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
908.045(3) (2009).  For a discussion of the two alternatives, see Tom Lininger, 
Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 315–20 (2007). 
68 OR. EVID. CODE 804(3)(e). 
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opponent has purposefully procured the absence of the declarant, 
either through classic witness tampering69 or through some other 
misconduct causing death or incapacity.70  So long as the opponent 
intentionally and knowingly committed the act that caused the 
unavailability, the opponent need not have specifically intended that 
the declarant become unavailable as a trial witness.71 
II 
REASONS FOR OREGON’S DISTINCTIVE APPROACH 
The Oregon Legislature has provided little record of the reasons for 
its refusal to adopt all of the provisions in the FRE.  Nonetheless, it 
seems likely that Oregon’s unique approach is due, at least in part, to 
five factors: the unusual strength of confrontation rights in Oregon, 
the state’s zealous commitment to privacy, the populist tradition that 
has led Oregonians to trust juries and to distrust judges, the low 
tolerance for deceitful tactics by lawyers, and the state’s special 
concern about domestic violence.  The following subparts will 
explore each of these factors in turn. 
A.  Confrontation Rights in Oregon 
The accused enjoys greater confrontation rights in Oregon courts 
than in federal courts.  While the U.S. Constitution guarantees the 
accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,”72 
 
69 OR. EVID. CODE 804(3)(g). 
70 OR. EVID. CODE 804(3)(f). 
71 See OR. EVID. CODE 803(3)(f).  Oregon approved its unique forfeiture rules in 2005.  
See 2005 Or. Laws 1232.  These rules stand in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling 
in California v. Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).  In Giles, the Court held that the constitutional 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing requires proof of specific intent to silence the 
declarant as a trial witness.  Id. at 359–62.  The Giles majority noted in a footnote that 
Oregon’s forfeiture rules are broader than their counterparts in other states, and they are 
broader than the forfeiture doctrine that the Court approved in Giles.  Id. at 367 n.2 (“Only 
a single state evidentiary code appears to contain a forfeiture rule broader than our holding 
in this case (and in Crawford) allow. . . . .  The lone forfeiture exception whose text 
reaches more broadly than the rule we adopt is an Oregon rule adopted in 2005.” (citations 
omitted)).  Of course, the Giles holding applies only to hearsay offered against the 
accused, while the Oregon forfeiture rules apply to civil and criminal trials.  The Oregon 
rules are not unconstitutional on their face because they do not necessarily offend the 
Confrontation Clause, which applies only when the government offers evidence against 
the accused. 
72 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides as 
follows: 
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the Oregon Constitution goes a step further.  Article 1, section 11 of 
the Oregon Constitution grants to the accused the right “to meet the 
witnesses face to face”73—a right that the Oregon courts have 
interpreted to impose higher requirements than are necessary under 
the Federal Confrontation Clause.74 
Oregon’s unique confrontation clause places a heavy burden on 
prosecutors.  They cannot offer hearsay against the accused when live 
testimony is available from the same declarant.  Whether the 
prosecutor is invoking a restricted or unrestricted hearsay exception,75 
the Oregon Constitution will not abide the admission of hearsay 
against the accused until the prosecutor has shown that the declarant 
is unavailable.  This requirement goes far beyond present federal 
constitutional jurisprudence.76  Oregon is one of the few states that 
continue to enforce the “unavailability prong” of the Roberts test.77 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
Id. 
73 Article 1, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an 
impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to 
be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to 
face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . . 
OR. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
74 State v. Moore, 334 Or. 328, 331–41 (2002) (discussing the difference between the 
federal and state confrontation clauses and declining to follow the post-Roberts federal 
confrontation jurisprudence that dispensed with the unavailability test when the 
prosecution offered evidence against the accused pursuant to the firmly rooted hearsay 
exception). 
75 The term “restricted hearsay exception” refers to exceptions under OEC 804, all of 
which require as a predicate that the proponent show the declarant is unavailable for one of 
the enumerated reasons.  OR. EVID. CODE 804(3).  The term “unrestricted hearsay 
exception” refers to exceptions under OEC 803, which do not require unavailability.  OR. 
EVID. CODE 803. 
76 The unavailability requirement derives from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).  
The Court’s subsequent rulings dispensed with the unavailability requirement when the 
prosecution offered the evidence pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  E.g., 
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (“Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand 
for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the 
government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.”).  The Court abrogated 
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Commensurate with the preference for confrontation in Oregon’s 
constitutional jurisprudence, the OEC assigns a high priority to cross-
examination.78  For example, the Oregon Legislature has 
memorialized some of the confrontation requirements of Roberts in 
hearsay rules such as OEC 803(18a) and OEC 803(26), and it has 
retained that language even after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
Roberts in 2004.79  The Oregon Legislature has also memorialized the 
confrontation requirements for remote testimony by child witnesses.80  
Commentators have noted that confrontation of child witnesses is 
more common in Oregon due to the OEC’s distinctive provisions for 
child witnesses.81 
Oregon’s preference for confrontation is evident in the OEC’s list 
of unrestricted and restricted exceptions.  Oregon seems wary of the 
 
Roberts altogether in Crawford.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–65 (2004).  
Oregon, however, continues to apply the unavailability requirement in Roberts because 
Oregon shares the “preference for face-to-face accusation” that the U.S. Supreme Court 
discussed in Roberts.  448 U.S. at 65; accord State v. Lucas, 213 Or. App. 277, 278–79 
(2007) (noting that Oregon continues to follow the unavailability requirement in Roberts 
even after Crawford); Moore, 334 Or. at 331–41 (indicating that Oregon’s continued 
application of the unavailability test does not depend on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
continued adherence to that test). 
77 See, e.g., State v. McGriff, 871 P.2d 782, 790 (Haw. 1994) (holding that the state 
constitution imposes the unavailability requirement); State v. Lopez, 926 P.2d 784, 789 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (same); see also State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 371–72 (N.J. 2005) 
(declining to require the declarant’s testimony or unavailability as a condition of 
admissibility, but stating that “the issue deserves careful study,” and submitting the matter 
“to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence to consider whether a rule 
change would be advisable”). 
78 Confrontation is important as a policy matter.  Confrontation advances utilitarian 
objectives because it aids in the discovery of the truth.  2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 1697 
(1904) (characterizing cross-examination as “the greatest legal engine ever invented for 
the discovery of the truth”); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373 (indicating 
that the “open examination of witnesses . . . is much more conducive to the clearing up of 
truth”); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF 
ENGLAND 258 (1713) (adversarial testing “beats and bolts out the Truth much better”); cf. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62 (discussing the utility of cross-examination).  There is also 
an equitable rationale for confrontation; the accuser must be accountable in court for his 
accusation, and face-to-face confrontation assures accountability.  Confrontation serves 
deontological objectives by according respect to both the declarant and the accused, and 
by granting them autonomy in giving and challenging evidence. 
79 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–65 (holding that Roberts is no longer good law). 
80 OR. EVID. CODE 803(24) (prescribing the procedure for closed-circuit testimony). 
81 Crawford, Davis & the Right of Confrontation: Where Do We Go from Here?, 19 
REGENT U. L. REV. 507, 520 (2007) (printing comments of Robert Mosteller, a professor 
at Duke Law School, during a symposium on the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
under the Confrontation Clause). 
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unrestricted hearsay exceptions in the FRE because these exceptions 
do not give preference to live testimony.  Thus, Oregon has declined 
to adopt FRE 804(1), the unrestricted hearsay exception for present 
sense impressions.  On the other hand, Oregon has adopted all of the 
restricted hearsay exceptions in the FRE.  Oregon has even broadened 
the scope of OEC 804(3)(b), the restricted exception for dying 
declarations, and Oregon has added some restricted hearsay 
exceptions that do not appear in the FRE, such as OEC 804(3)(e) and 
(g).  The curtailment of unrestricted hearsay exceptions, coupled with 
the expansion of restricted hearsay exceptions, suggests that Oregon 
favors confrontation of live declarants and feels more comfortable 
treating hearsay as “a last resort.” 
In many ways, cross-examination in Oregon courts is more robust 
than it is in federal courts.  OEC 609 permits impeachment with 
convictions that are up to fifteen years old, while FRE 609 sets the 
time limit at ten years.  OEC 609 allows impeachment with prior 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, while FRE 609 excludes 
this evidence.  OEC 609-1 specifically authorizes impeachment with 
evidence of bias; the FRE have no on-point rule for bias.  While FRE 
614 and 706 allow the judge to call lay and expert witnesses, the OEC 
does not—an omission that may reflect concern about the difficulty of 
cross-examining the “judge’s witness.” 
In sum, Oregon demands a higher degree of confrontation than is 
minimally necessary in federal court.  This fundamental difference 
finds expression in several unique provisions of the OEC that require, 
or at least facilitate, cross-examination. 
B.  Privacy Rights in Oregon 
While Oregon favors confrontation in court, this state also 
zealously protects its citizens’ right to privacy.  The state has a 
libertarian culture that traces back to its frontier history.  Oregonians 
have always enjoyed a large measure of privacy due to the state’s 
sparse population relative to its size.82  Ever since Lewis and Clark 
blazed a trail to the mouth of the Columbia River in 1805, Oregon has 
 
82 Of the thirty-six counties in Oregon, only one, Multnomah, is predominantly urban.  
See Local Government, OR. BLUE BOOK, http://bluebook.state.or.us/local/index.htm (last 
visited May 17, 2011) (providing detailed information about each county’s population and 
area). 
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celebrated an “ethos of rugged individualism,”83 and privacy is an 
important part of that legacy. 
The drafters of the Oregon Constitution made sure that this state 
would protect privacy rights in a manner befitting its libertarian 
history.  Article 1, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution defines the 
privacy right with language different from that used in the Federal 
Fourth Amendment, and Oregon courts have seized upon this 
difference as authorization to protect privacy rights more strictly.84 
Oregon’s deep commitment to privacy is evident in this state’s 
criminal justice system.  For example, Oregon courts have repudiated 
the federal “open fields” doctrine.85  Oregon courts hold that warrants 
are necessary before police may monitor suspects’ cars with GPS 
technology,86 while the federal courts in this state permit such 
tracking.87  Oregon courts have rejected the federal “good faith 
exception” to the exclusionary rule.88  The Oregon Legislature 
prohibited state and local police officers from inquiring about the 
immigration status of any person.89  Oregon lawmakers recently 
created a criminal offense for “invasion of personal privacy.”90 
Oregon’s Rules of Civil Procedure also protect privacy to an 
unusual degree.  Oregon does not allow civil litigants to use all the 
discovery techniques that are available in federal court.  For example, 
interrogatories are not permissible in Oregon.91  Oregon does not 
 
83 Brian Fox, Op-Ed, Oregon’s Future at Risk, OREGONIAN, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www 
.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/03/oregons_future_at_risk.html. 
84 For an excellent discussion of the difference between the U.S. and Oregon 
constitutions with respect to privacy rights, see Jack L. Landau, The Search for the 
Meaning of Oregon’s Search and Seizure Clause, 87 OR. L. REV. 819, 851–59 (2008). 
85 State v. Dixson, 307 Or. 195, 208, 766 P.2d 1015, 1022 (1988) (en banc). 
86 State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 172–73, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048–49 (1988) (holding 
that an electronic tracking device on an auto requires a warrant absent an emergency). 
87 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215–17 (9th Cir. 2010) (allowing 
police to install GPS devices on suspects’ vehicles without search warrants). 
88  State v. Toste, 196 Or. App. 11, 21 n.4 (2004) (noting that Oregon lacks an 
equivalent to the federal good faith exception). 
89 OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2009) (prohibiting state and local law enforcement 
officials from assisting in any way with investigation of immigration offenses). 
90 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.700 (2009) (criminalizing the “invasion of personal privacy,” 
which includes photographing or otherwise recording a person in a state of nudity, among 
other provisions). 
91 See OR. R. CIV. P. 36 A (listing various discovery methods similar to those available 
in federal court, but omitting interrogatories). 
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allow civil litigants to depose their opponents’ experts, or even to 
discover the identity of those witnesses, in advance of trial.92 
Other legislative acts show Oregonians’ deep concern about 
privacy rights.  Oregon passed the strictest law in the nation to 
safeguard the personal information that employers maintain 
concerning their employees.93  Oregon has pioneered legislation to 
protect genetic and medical privacy.94  Oregon has prohibited the use 
of credit checks as a means of screening prospective employees.95  
Oregon legislators refused to cooperate in the federal government’s 
recent attempt to establish a standardized ID card for U.S. citizens; 
among other concerns, legislators cited their fear that the new regime 
would compromise personal privacy.96 
Given Oregon’s zeal to protect privacy in so many different 
contexts, it is not surprising that the OEC has surpassed the FRE in 
safeguarding the personal information of witnesses.  Oregon has 
established strong evidentiary privileges for a wide range of 
relationships.  Oregon recognizes the lawyer-client privilege, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the physician-patient privilege, the 
nurse-patient privilege, the school employee-student privilege, the 
social worker-client privilege, the spousal privilege, the clergy-
penitent privilege, the counselor-client privilege, the stenographer-
employer privilege, the interpreter privilege, and the informer 
privilege, among others.97  Oregon courts enforce privileges strictly, 
 
92 See OR. R. CIV. P. 36 B (indicating scope of permissible pretrial discovery); Gwin v. 
Lynn, 344 Or. 65, 71, 176 P.3d 1248, 1252 (2008) (“ORCP 36 B does not authorize trial 
courts to order pretrial disclosure of the identity and intended testimony of expert 
witnesses.”). 
93 Phillip Gordon, New Oregon Law Imposes Most Stringent Information Security 
Standards Yet on Employers, LITTLER WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNSEL (Aug. 13, 2007), 
http://privacyblog.littler.com/2007/08/articles/data-security/new-oregon-law-imposes        
-most-stringent-information-security-standards-yet-on-employers/. 
94 Oregon Genetic Privacy Law, OR. HEALTH AUTHORITY, http://public.health.oregon 
.gov/DiseasesConditions/GeneticConditions/Pages/research.aspx (last visited May 17, 
2011) (containing summaries of genetic privacy laws in Oregon). 
95 Only a handful of states have such laws.  Jessica Van Berkel, New Law Prohibits 
Credit History Checks by Most Employers, OREGONIAN, June 30, 2010, http://www 
.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/06/new_law_prohibits_credit_check.html. 
96 Michelle Cole, Oregon Lawmakers Reject Federal Real ID Costs, OREGONIAN, May 
29, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/05/oregon_lawmakers 
_reject_federa.html (reporting that the Oregon House of Representatives approved a bill 
that directed state agencies not to comply with the federal “Real ID” law). 
97 OR. EVID. CODE 503–510 (setting forth various evidentiary privileges); see supra 
notes 31–42 and accompanying text.  The FRE do not enumerate privileges in the federal 
system.  Most states have not established as many evidentiary privileges as Oregon has, 
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declining to find waiver except in clear cases,98 and prohibiting 
attorneys from commenting on the invocation of a privilege.99 
Outside the context of privilege law, the OEC includes several 
unique provisions that reflect the state’s respect for privacy.  
Oregon’s rape shield law, OEC 412, goes much further than its 
federal counterpart in protecting the privacy of complainants in rape 
cases; Oregon’s version excludes evidence of the complainant’s dress, 
reputation, and prior consensual sexual history, unless the latter is 
offered for a narrow list of permissible purposes.100  OEC 311 lists 
presumptions that seem intended, at least in part, to protect privacy: 
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate,101 the 
presumption that a man and woman holding themselves out to be 
married are in fact married,102 and the presumption that a person 
takes ordinary care of the person’s own concerns.103 
In sum, several unique provisions of the OEC are attributable to 
this state’s unusual commitment to privacy.  Oregonians have long 
valued their freedom from intrusion by others, including the 
government.  Such values have influenced the development of 
evidentiary rules that protect privacy more than their federal 
counterparts. 
C.  Oregon’s History of Populism and Faith in Juries 
Oregon is arguably the most populist state in the nation.  No state 
has a stronger tradition of direct democracy than does Oregon.  Over 
the last century, Oregonians have voted on more initiatives and 
 
and most states do not enforce their privileges as strictly as Oregon does.  See 3 
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, §§ 501–10. 
98 E.g., OR. EVID. CODE 511 (providing for waiver of privilege by voluntary 
disclosure); OR. EVID. CODE 512 (refusing to find waiver for matters disclosed under 
compulsion or without the opportunity to claim privilege). 
99 OR. EVID. CODE 513 (prohibiting adverse comment on, or inference from, invocation 
of privilege). 
100 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (comparing OEC 412 with FRE 412). 
101 OR. EVID. CODE 311(1)(v) (establishing the presumption that “[a] child born in 
lawful wedlock is legitimate”). 
102 OR. EVID. CODE 311(1)(u) (establishing the presumption that “[a] man and woman 
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of 
marriage”). 
103 OR. EVID. CODE 311(1)(b) (establishing the presumption that “[a] person takes 
ordinary care of the person’s own concerns”). 
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referenda than have voters in any other state.104  Some of the most 
important laws in this state’s history—relating to crime, property 
rights, taxation, assisted suicide, and environmental protection, 
among other topics—owe their genesis to ballot measures, not to 
legislative enactments.105 
Just as Oregon reveres direct democracy, Oregon places great trust 
in juries.  The jury allows the common man to control the courtroom 
in the same way he controls the rest of the state government.  The 
Oregon Constitution uses strong language in Article 1, section 17, 
which provides that “the right of Trial by Jury shall remain 
inviolate.”106  Scholars comparing state constitutions have noted that 
Oregon’s clause requiring jury trials uses more emphatic language 
than is typical in such clauses.107 
Attempts to check the power of juries have usually proven 
unsuccessful in this state.  When advocates for tort reform persuaded 
legislators to approve a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages, the 
Oregon Supreme Court struck down this law as a limitation on the 
right to trial by jury.108  Oregon gained notoriety when the state’s 
appellate courts reinstated a jury’s $80 million verdict against Philip 
Morris, then reinstated the same verdict again after the U.S. Supreme 
Court remanded the case based on concerns about possible 
 
104 Norman R. Williams, Direct Democracy, the Guaranty Clause, and the Politics of 
the “Political Question” Doctrine: Revisiting Pacific Telephone, 87 OR. L. REV. 979, 
980–81 (2008) (“[B]etween 1902 and 2007, Oregonians put 340 initiatives and 62 
referenda on the ballot.  Of those, 118 of the initiatives and 21 of the referenda passed.  
During the same period, the Oregon Legislature referred 407 measures to the people, of 
which 233 passed.”).  Oregon leads the nation in its reliance on direct democracy.  See Jeff 
Mapes, Only a Few Ballot Initiatives Look to Qualify for Oregon Ballot This November, 
OREGONIAN, Apr. 3, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/04/only 
_a_few_ballot_initiatives.html (observing that Oregon “has had more ballot initiatives 
than any other state—357—since it pioneered direct democracy in 1904”). 
105 See Oregon Election History, OR. BLUE BOOK, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state 
/elections/elections06.htm (last visited May 17, 2011) (maintaining a list of all ballot 
measures in Oregon elections and the results in each election). 
106 OR. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
107 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in 
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 77 (2008) (noting that the Oregon 
Constitution uses relatively emphatic language requiring jury trials in civil cases). 
108 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 78–79, 987 P.2d 463, 473 (1999) (striking 
down limits on damage awards under OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(1) because this law 
violated the constitutional right to jury trials in civil cases under Article I, section 17 of the 
Oregon Constitution), clarified, 329 Or. 369, 987 P.2d 476 (1999). 
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overreaching by the jury.109  Oregon stands by its controversial rule 
permitting nonunanimous jury verdicts in felony cases, even though 
forty-eight states and the U.S. courts insist upon unanimous verdicts 
in all felony trials.110  Oregon voters even approved a measure 
allowing prosecutors to veto defendants’ waivers of jury trials in 
criminal cases.111 
Oregon’s confidence in juries manifests itself in several distinctive 
provisions of the OEC.  While FRE 404(b) forbids the introduction of 
propensity evidence except for limited purposes, OEC 404(4) allows 
the use of propensity evidence in criminal cases: “In criminal cases, 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by the defendant is 
admissible if relevant . . . .”112  Oregon also has declined to adopt 
FRE 704(b), the so-called “Hinckley Rule” that prevents the jury 
from considering expert testimony on the mental state of the accused.  
OEC 609 allows juries to consider convictions of witnesses that 
occurred within the prior fifteen years,113 while the time limit under 
FRE 609 is ten years.114  As these examples illustrate, Oregon trusts 
its juries to hear a wider range of evidence than is admissible in 
federal court. 
 
109 Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 344 Or. 45, 61, 176 P.3d 1255, 1263–64 (2008) 
(reinstating a jury verdict awarding $80 million in damages, even though the U.S. 
Supreme Court had remanded the case); see also Ashbel S. Green, Justices Uphold 
Cigarette Damages: Oregon’s High Court Once Again Affirms $79.5 Million Verdict 
Against Philip Morris, OREGONIAN, Feb. 1, 2008, http://blog.oregonlive.com 
/oregonianextra/2009/03/history_of_the_williams_family.html#11. 
110 UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh has challenged the Oregon rule by filing a 
petition for writ of certiorari on September 9, 2010, in Herrera v. Oregon.  Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, Herrera v. Oregon (No. A141205), available at http://www.law.ucla 
.edu/volokh/herrera.pdf.  The U.S. Supreme Court previously rejected such a challenge to 
Oregon’s rule in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  For a general discussion of 
Oregon’s distinctive rule and the cert petition filed by Professor Volokh, see Editorial, A 
New Challenge to Non-Unanimous Jury Convictions, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/Examiner-Opinion-Zone/A-new         
-challenge-to-non-unanimous-jury-convictions-103160269.html (indicating that only 
Oregon and Louisiana allow nonunanimous verdicts in felony trials). 
111 In 1996, Oregonians approved Ballot Measure 40, which gave the public, through 
the prosecutor, the right to demand jury trial in criminal cases.  The measure passed with a 
majority of nearly sixty percent, but the Oregon Supreme Court later invalidated this result 
because the ballot measure in question stated multiple questions in violation of the Oregon 
Constitution.  Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 256–58, 959 P.2d 49, 53 (1998) (holding 
that multiple propositions require separate votes). 
112 OR. EVID. CODE 404(4). 
113 OR. EVID. CODE 609(3)(a). 
114 FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 
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Conversely, Oregon’s evidence rules reflect a distrust of judges.  
Perhaps fearing that judges would usurp the fact-finding role of juries, 
the framers of the Oregon rules declined to adopt provisions of the 
FRE that allow judges to call and question witnesses, and that allow 
judges to summon expert witnesses at public expense.115  OEC 309, 
which governs presumptions, departs from the federal model in 
emphasizing that “[t]he judge is not authorized to direct the jury to 
find a presumed fact against the accused.”116  The Oregon rules also 
differ from the federal rules in allowing jurors to testify after 
rendering their verdict; Oregon’s approach permits jurors to reveal 
procedural improprieties that occurred during the trial, including 
improper influence brought to bear on the jury by the judge.117 
Oregon’s populist values pervade the state’s evidentiary rules.  
Provisions of the FRE that limit the scope of evidence heard by the 
jury, or that increase the power of judges in the fact-finding process, 
are conspicuously absent from the OEC. 
D.  Oregon’s Insistence on Honesty and Fair Play in Litigation 
Oregon takes an unusually hard line against deceit by lawyers.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court has interpreted the state’s ethics code to 
prohibit any dishonesty by lawyers, even the use of undercover 
investigative techniques that are common in the other forty-nine 
states.118  The Oregon Supreme Court issued an order insisting upon 
 
115 The OEC has no counterpart to FRE 614, which allows the court to call and 
interrogate witnesses. 
116 OR. EVID. CODE 309(1). 
117 Compare FED. R. EVID. 606 (preventing a juror from testifying in the present trial or 
in a subsequent hearing concerning the jury’s deliberations) with OR. EVID. CODE 606 
(preventing a juror from testifying in the present trial but not preventing the juror from 
testifying in a subsequent hearing concerning the jury’s deliberations). 
118 In re Conduct of Gatti, 330 Or. 517, 532–33, 8 P.3d 966, 976 (2000) (en banc) 
(interpreting Oregon’s ethical rule against dishonesty by lawyers, then labeled DR 1-
102(A)(3), to forbid lawyers’ involvement in deceptive undercover investigations).  While 
all states share the same provision in their codes of ethics, every other court addressing 
this issue has held that the rule against dishonesty does not automatically bar lawyers from 
supervising deceptive undercover operations by police.  See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int’l 
Collectors Soc’y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that a public or private lawyer 
could properly employ an undercover investigator to detect ongoing violations of law, 
especially where detection of these violations would otherwise be difficult); MINN. 
LAWYERS PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY BD., OP. NO. 18, SECRET RECORDINGS OF 
CONVERSATIONS (1996) (same); BD. OF COMM. ON GRIEVANCES & DISCIPLINE, SUP. CT. 
OF OHIO, OP. 97-3 (1997) (same); ETHICS ADVISORY COMM., UTAH STATE BAR, OP. 02-
05 (2002) (a government attorney does not violate the ethical rule prohibiting dishonesty if 
the lawyer directs a covert investigation involving dishonesty); VA. STATE BAR, VA. 
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civility and candor by lawyers appearing in the state’s courts.119  This 
concern about deceit by lawyers is not new.  A notorious 1974 ruling 
by the Oregon Supreme Court suspended an assistant attorney general 
who mischaracterized answers given by a government witness in 
response to a discovery request.120 
When Oregon legislators considered whether to adopt the FRE at 
the end of the 1970s, they modified rules that appeared to be too 
indulgent of mendacity.  For example, Oregon adopted a unique 
crime-fraud exception to various privileges, allowing disclosure 
where necessary to reveal “a clear and serious intent” to commit 
certain categories of crime.121  The federal crime-fraud exception is 
more restrictive,122 and its narrow scope hinders the detection of 
some criminal and fraudulent schemes. 
Oregon’s intolerance of gamesmanship manifests itself most 
clearly in the OEC’s unique hearsay exceptions.  OEC 804(3)(f) and 
(g), which set forth the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, are 
particularly noteworthy.  If an opponent of hearsay has purposefully 
procured the unavailability of a hearsay declarant, or has intentionally 
engaged in conduct that would foreseeably cause such unavailability, 
then that opponent forfeits any objection that might otherwise be 
available under the hearsay rules.123  The U.S. Supreme Court 
indicated recently that Oregon’s doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing 
is the most expansive in the nation.124  Similarly, Oregon’s version of 
the dying declaration exception is among the most expansive in the 
 
LEGAL ETHICS OP. 1738, ATTORNEY PARTICIPATION IN ELECTRONIC RECORDING 
WITHOUT CONSENT OF PARTY BEING RECORDED (2002) (same).  No state other than 
Oregon interpreted this rule to prohibit lawyers’ involvement in deceptive undercover 
investigations. 
119 OR. STATE BAR, STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONALISM (2006), available at 
http://www.osbar.org/_docs/rulesregs/professionalism.pdf. 
120 In re Preston, 269 Or. 271, 272, 525 P.2d 59, 59 (1974) (en banc) (indicating that the 
respondent was less than candid in complying with interrogatories directed at the 
government witness). 
121 Supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
122 See, e.g., In re Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d 976, 982–83 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(setting forth elements of the crime-fraud exception and collecting opinions in other 
federal circuit courts listing similar requirements). 
123 OR. EVID. CODE 804(3)(f)–(g). 
124 In California v. Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), the Court noted that Oregon’s forfeiture 
rules are broader than their counterparts in other states, and they are broader than the 
federal forfeiture rule in FRE 804(b)(6).  Id. at 367 n.2. 
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nation, reflecting this state’s commitment to the equitable principle125 
that one who kills a witness should not profit from the absence of that 
witness at trial.  Simply put, Oregon’s evidentiary rules do not reward 
the litigant or attorney who has unclean hands. 
E.  Oregon’s Special Concern About Domestic Violence and Sexual 
Assault 
Oregon has earned a national reputation for innovating new 
strategies to facilitate prosecution of domestic violence and sexual 
assault.126  A coalition of Democratic and Republican legislators has 
found common ground in the campaign to protect victims from such 
crimes.127  While Oregon’s Democrats are generally wary of laws and 
rules that burden the accused, the imperative of prosecuting violence 
against women has generally trumped concerns about procedural 
protections for the accused. 
Oregon’s evidentiary rules are replete with special provisions for 
prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault.  Several 
examples appear in Oregon’s hearsay rules.  OEC 803(18a) admits 
hearsay statements from children or seniors complaining of abuse.128  
OEC 803(24) prescribes a procedure for young children or disabled 
witnesses to testify from a remote location via closed circuit 
 
125 One rationale for the dying declaration exception is the equitable concern that 
murderers should be accountable for the hearsay statements of their victims.  Richard D. 
Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 439, 467 (2004) (“[T]he admissibility of dying declarations . . . is best understood as 
a reflection of the principle that a defendant who renders a witness unavailable by 
wrongful means cannot complain about her absence at trial.”).  FRE 804(b)(2), the federal 
version of this exception, admits a hearsay statement by a person who believes his or her 
death is imminent, if the statement concerns the cause or circumstances of the declarant’s 
death, and if the present proceeding is either a civil trial or a prosecution for homicide.  
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).  Oregon is among a handful of states extending the dying 
declaration exception to all categories of criminal prosecutions, not just homicide cases.  
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
126 Tom Lininger, Should Oregon Adopt the New ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct?, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2003) (discussing Oregon’s leadership in 
innovating strategies for prosecuting domestic violence). 
127 E.g., Vicki Walker & Tom Lininger, Bill Would Help Prosecute Batterers, 
REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Apr. 18, 2004 (copy on file with author) (sounding 
themes that would appeal to both Democrats and Republicans).  See generally Aya Gruber, 
Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 582–86 (2009) 
(explaining the alliance between progressive feminists and conservative advocates of 
crime control). 
128 OR. EVID. CODE 803(18a). 
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television when necessary to avoid psychological harm.129  OEC 
803(26) admits statements narrating domestic violence to police and 
other professionals within twenty-four hours of the incident.130  
Neither the FRE nor any other state evidence code devotes so many of 
its unrestricted hearsay exceptions to the express purpose of 
prosecuting intimate violence.131 
The OEC freely admits evidence of past misconduct by the accused 
if the present prosecution alleges domestic violence or sexual assault.  
OEC 609 allows impeachment of testifying defendants with evidence 
of their prior misdemeanors involving domestic violence, even if 
those misdemeanor offenses did not include dishonesty as an 
element.132  FRE 609 would never abide such evidence.133  Similarly, 
OEC 404-1 departs from FRE 404 in allowing the prosecution to 
admit evidence that the accused has engaged in a pattern of abuse or 
harassment; there is no need for the defendant to “open the door” 
before the prosecution can offer such evidence in Oregon.134  By 
contrast, OEC 412 is far stricter than its federal counterpart in limiting 
evidence of the complainant’s history in cases involving allegations 
of rape.135  Critics complain that Oregon has tilted the playing field 
significantly in such cases.136 
The special rules for prosecution of domestic violence and sexual 
assault are not doctrinally consistent with the rest of the OEC.  There 
is no principled reason why intimate violence requires such special 
treatment, while the OEC relegates other categories of violent crime 
to the baseline rules.  The only explanation lies in the politics of 
violence against women, which make for strange bedfellows in the 
Oregon Legislature. 
 
129 OR. EVID. CODE 803(24). 
130 OR. EVID. CODE 803(26). 
131 See FED. R. EVID. 803; 6 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, art. VIII (comparing 
states’ analogs to FRE 803). 
132 OR. EVID. CODE 609(2). 
133 FED. R. EVID. 609 (allowing impeachment with convictions only for misdemeanor 
offenses that include dishonesty as an element). 
134 Compare OR. EVID. CODE 404-1 with FED. R. EVID. 404. 
135 Compare OR. EVID. CODE 412 with FED. R. EVID. 412.  OEC 412 is longer than 
FRE 412 and sets forth more limitations on the use of evidence concerning the prior sexual 
activity and dress of the complainant. 
136 E.g., Peter R. Dworkin, Confronting Your Abuser in Oregon: A New Domestic 
Violence Hearsay Objection, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 299, 304–06 (2001) (noting 
criticisms of OEC 803(26) raised by the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association 
and the Juvenile Rights Project). 
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III 
ADVANTAGES OF ADOPTING THE NEW FRE IN OREGON 
Adoption of the restyled FRE could prove beneficial in Oregon for 
several reasons.  First, the new language would simplify Oregon’s 
evidentiary rules, eliminating idiosyncratic and confusing language.  
Second, the adoption of the FRE would enlarge the universe of citable 
case law for Oregon judges and practitioners.  Third, the 
standardization of evidence law could help to facilitate the regional 
practice of law.  Fourth, greater uniformity could reduce the 
incentives for “forum shopping.”  Finally, adoption of the FRE would 
provide an excuse to fix imperfections in the OEC, particularly in 
OEC 608 and 609.  Each of these potential advantages is discussed in 
turn below.  Part IV then considers disadvantages of importing the 
restyled FRE to Oregon. 
A.  Enhanced Clarity 
The primary advantage of the restyled FRE is their simplification 
of the evidentiary rules.  Such clarity streamlines trial practice and 
improves the likelihood that cases will settle in advance of trial 
because parties will be better able to predict the admissibility of their 
evidence at trial.  Rates of malpractice would hopefully drop as 
lawyers would better understand the requirements of the evidentiary 
rules, and the number of convictions reversed due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel would hopefully drop as well.  Pro se litigants 
would welcome the simplification of the OEC, especially now that the 
recession has necessitated that a growing number of litigants 
represent themselves.  Law students would find evidence law more 
accessible, and the similarity of the FRE to the OEC would ease the 
difficulty of preparing for the Oregon Bar Exam. 
One way that the drafters of the restyled FRE improved the clarity 
of the rules is by substituting plain language for the existing versions 
of the rules, which were often convoluted, technical, and verbose.  
The restyled FRE minimized the use of inherently ambiguous words; 
for example, the restyling eliminated the use of “shall,” which can 
mean “must,” “may,” or something else, depending on the context.137  
The restyled FRE reduced the use of inconsistent terms, such as 
switching between “accused” and “defendant” in a single rule, or 
 
137 RESTYLED FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note, available at http://federal 
evidence.com/pdf/2009/Misc/FRE_Restyle_101-415.pdf. 
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switching between “party opponent” and “opposing party” within the 
same rule.138  The restyled rules reduced the use of redundant 
“intensifiers” because these phrases merely state the obvious and 
suggest unwarranted inferences when they are absent from other 
rules.139  The restyled FRE present many of the rules in outline form, 
using progressively indented subparagraphs with headings and 
substituting vertical for horizontal lists.140 
A few examples show the improvement to the rules.  Some rules 
have benefited greatly from the deletion of redundant or unnecessary 
language.  Examples include FRE 401,141 FRE 601,142 and FRE 
604.143  Oregon has followed the original federal model for all three 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id.; see, e.g., RESTYLED FED. R. EVID. 104(c) (omitting “in all cases”); RESTYLED 
FED. R. EVID. 602 (omitting “but need not”); RESTYLED FED. R. EVID. 611(b) (omitting 
“in the exercise of discretion”). 
140 RESTYLED FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note. 
141 The current version of FRE 401 reads as follows: 
RULE 401. DEFINITION OF “RELEVANT EVIDENCE.”  “Relevant evidence” 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
The restyled FRE 401 reads as follows: 
RULE 401. TEST FOR RELEVANT EVIDENCE.  Evidence is relevant if it has any 
tendency to make more or less probable the existence of a fact that is of 
consequence in determining the action. 
142 The current version of FRE 601 reads as follows: 
RULE 601. GENERAL RULE OF COMPETENCY.  Every person is competent to be 
a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.  However, in civil actions 
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which 
State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be 
determined in accordance with State law. 
The restyled FRE 601 reads as follows: 
RULE 601. COMPETENCY TO TESTIFY IN GENERAL.  Every person is competent 
to be a witness unless these rules provide otherwise.  But in a civil case, state law 
governs the witness’s competency regarding a claim or defense for which state 
law supplies the rule of decision. 
143 The current version of FRE 604 reads as follows: 
RULE 604. INTERPRETERS.  An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these 
rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or 
affirmation to make a true translation. 
The restyled FRE 604 reads as follows: 
RULE 604. INTERPRETER.  An interpreter must be qualified and must give an 
oath or affirmation to make a true translation. 
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rules,144 so Oregon should strongly consider adopting the restyled 
versions. 
The use of vertical lists has significantly improved several rules.  
FRE 104(c),145 FRE 609(d),146 FRE 702,147 and FRE 803(6)148 all 
 
144 Of course, Oregon would not need to adopt the second sentence of the restyled FRE 
601, which specifies which state’s competency rules will apply in a federal diversity 
action. 
145 The current version of FRE 104(c) reads as follows: 
(c) HEARING OF JURY. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all 
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury.  Hearings on other preliminary 
matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an 
accused is a witness and so requests. 
The restyled FRE 104(c) reads as follows: 
(c) MATTERS THAT THE JURY MUST NOT HEAR.  A hearing on a preliminary 
question must be conducted outside the jury’s hearing if: 
(1) the hearing involves the admissibility of a confession; 
(2) a defendant in a criminal case is a witness and requests that the jury not 
be present; or 
(3) justice so requires. 
146 The current version of FRE 609(d) reads as follows: 
(d) JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS.  Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally 
not admissible under this rule.  The court may, however, in a criminal case allow 
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if 
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult 
and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair 
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
The restyled version of FRE 609(d) reads as follows: 
(d) JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS.  Evidence of a juvenile adjudication is 
admissible under this rule only if: 
(1) it is offered in a criminal case; 
(2) the adjudication was of a witness other the defendant; 
(3) a conviction of an adult for that offense would be admissible to attack 
the adult’s credibility; and 
(4) admitting the evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt or 
innocence. 
147 The current version of FRE 702 reads as follows: 
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS.  If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness 
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
The restyled FRE 702 reads as follows: 
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became much clearer when presented with progressively indented 
subpoints.  The reorganization makes the rules easier to scrutinize 
quickly, allowing the reader to find the relevant portion right away.  
Oregon borrowed the old versions of all four rules from the FRE, so 
Oregon should update the OEC in accordance with the revisions to 
the FRE. 
A few “restylings” of the FRE actually introduce slight substantive 
nuances.  For example, the old version of FRE 201(f) provides that 
judicial notice “may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.”  This 
 
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERT WITNESSES.  A witness who is qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 
the case. 
148 The current version of FRE 803(6) reads as follows: 
(6) RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED ACTIVITY.  A memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony 
of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with 
Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the 
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack 
of trustworthiness.  The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes 
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
The restyled FRE 803(6) reads as follows: 
(6) RECORDS OF A REGULARLY CONDUCTED ACTIVITY.  A record of an act, 
event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information 
transmitted by—someone with knowledge; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a 
business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; and 
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 
902(b)(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification. 
But this exception does not apply if the source of information or the method 
or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
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language is objectionable because, to the extent that it is accurate, it is 
unnecessary.  The language also seems to be somewhat misleading 
because judicial notice is not permissible on appeal in a criminal 
case.149  The restyled version of the FRE drops subpoint (f) entirely.  
Similarly, the restyling of FRE 407 has improved that rule by making 
clear that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible 
only to prove ownership, control, or feasibility when the opponent has 
raised a genuine dispute as to these matters.150  The present version of 
FRE 407 uses the qualifier “if controverted” at the end of several 
permissible purposes, creating ambiguity as to whether it modifies the 
whole or just the last antecedent.151  “Restylings” of this sort have 
both substantive and stylistic dimensions, but they would be welcome 
additions to the OEC. 
The present opacity of the FRE is not an urgent problem, but it 
needlessly causes confusion, hinders efficiency, and impedes pro se 
practice.  The restyled FRE clarify the original rules without 
distorting their meaning.  Oregon would benefit by adopting at least 
 
149 E.g., United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219, 224 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that judicial 
notice is not permissible on appeal in a criminal case because it would violate the right to 
jury trial). 
150 The current version of FRE 407 reads as follows: 
RULE 407. SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES.  When, after an injury or harm 
allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would 
have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a 
product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction.  
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures 
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or 
feasibility of precautionary measures, if converted, or impeachment. 
The restyled FRE 407 reads as follows: 
RULE 407. SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES.  When measures are taken that 
would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the 
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove: 
• negligence; 
• culpable conduct; 
• a defect in a product or its design; or 
• a need for a warning or instruction. 
But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment 
or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary 
measures. 
151 As applied in statutory construction, the rule of the last antecedent provides that a 
modifier generally refers to the most proximate prior noun.  See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.33 (6th ed. 2000). 
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some of the restyled FRE, so litigants in this state can more easily 
understand the rules of evidence. 
B.  Expansion of Citable Case Law 
Oregon attorneys sometimes complain about the dearth of appellate 
court decisions interpreting this state’s evidentiary rules.  There are 
only two appellate courts in Oregon: the Oregon Supreme Court and 
the Oregon Court of Appeals.  Oregon’s appellate courts issue 
approximately thirty to fifty opinions per year that cite the terms 
“Oregon Evidence Code” or “OEC.”152  A significant portion of these 
decisions address the evidentiary rules only in dicta or in summaries 
of procedural history, so the actual number of opinions interpreting 
the OEC is significantly less than thirty to fifty per year. 
States considering whether to adopt national uniform rules have 
sometimes cited the benefit of enlarging the case law available to 
practitioners and judges in those states.  For example, when Kentucky 
decided to adopt the FRE, an advisory committee noted that “there is 
a substantial and growing body of case law construing these Rules, 
case law which can be of invaluable assistance in the application of a 
new set of evidence rules for Kentucky.”153  The widespread adoption 
of a standardized code helps small states achieve the economies of 
scale that are necessary to establish a comprehensive body of case 
law. 
C.  Facilitation of Regional Practice 
Oregon lawyers increasingly practice in other states.  Oregon’s 
largest city, Portland, sits across the Columbia River from Vancouver, 
a sizeable city in Washington, and the citizens of these cities interact 
as if they live in the same community.  As the number of interstate 
commercial transactions grows, clients require lawyers who can 
represent them in several different jurisdictions.154  At least fifty law 
firms in Portland have offices in one or more other states.155  In 
 
152 These figures derive from the following search in the OR-CS database of Westlaw: 
da(last 10 years) & (“oregon evidence code” OEC). 
153 Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Ky. 2001) (quoting KY. R. EVID. 
prefatory note (1989)). 
154 Fried, supra note 12, at 52 (noting the increasing prevalence of interstate practice). 
155 Martindale Hubbell maintains a searchable database that lists all the firms in 
Portland and indicates which firms have an office in another state as well.  A search of this 
database on November 15, 2010, indicated that at least fifty firms in Portland have offices 
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addition to lawyers at these multistate firms, a wide range of other 
lawyers—including government officials, in-house counsel for 
businesses of all sizes, and even solo practitioners—are handling 
cases that require them to cross state lines.  The volatility of the 
economy has only heightened the interest in interstate practice, as 
lawyers are more willing than ever to travel great distances in order to 
find work. 
State bars are recognizing the increasingly interstate character of 
legal practice, and many are taking steps to assist lawyers whose 
caseloads straddle state boundaries.  The Oregon Bar has entered into 
a reciprocal arrangement with thirty-eight other state bars, whereby 
members of one bar may gain admission to the other bars after having 
served as a lawyer in good standing for three years.156  The state bars 
have amended their rules regulating unauthorized practice of law, and 
they have allowed limited practice by lawyers admitted in other 
states.157 
In light of this trend toward the regional integration of law practice, 
the standardization of evidentiary rules is a sensible proposition.  
Uniformity in evidence rules reduces inefficiency in interstate 
practice.158  The greater the harmony between the OEC and 
neighboring states’ evidence codes, the more easily Oregon-based 
lawyers can practice in those states.  Oregon, Idaho, and Washington 
have all modeled their evidence codes after the FRE, so these 
jurisdictions may wish to remain in step with one another by adopting 
the restyled federal rules. 
 
in other states.  The database is available at MARTINDALE.COM, http://www.martindale 
.com/Find-Lawyers-and-Law-Firms.aspx (last visited May 17, 2011). 
156 Admissions, OR. STATE BAR, http://www.osbar.org/admissions#reciprocity (last 
visited May 17, 2011) (detailing Oregon’s policy on reciprocal agreements). 
157 See, e.g., OR. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5 (setting forth many procedures through 
which lawyers may appear on a short-term basis, even without membership in the bar of 
that jurisdiction).  The foreign lawyer may seek pro hac vice admission, may associate 
with local counsel, or many confine his or her work to some tasks for which local 
admission is not necessary, such as mediation, interviews of witnesses, or negotiation of 
contracts.  Id.  Prior to 2005, the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility was less 
accommodating of interstate practice.  DR 3-101(B) provided simply that “[a] lawyer shall 
not practice law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the 
profession in that jurisdiction.”  OR. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 3-101(B) 
(2003). 
158 But see Kirgis, supra note 14, at 813–31 (suggesting that uniform evidence rules are 
not crucial for efficiency and that the major challenges in interstate trial practice arise from 
the novelty of each case and the logistics of trial preparation rather than from the variation 
between states’ evidence rules). 
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D.  Decreased Incentives for “Forum Shopping” 
Parties filing lawsuits often have a choice of venues.  They may 
choose between many states in which there are sufficient minimum 
contacts for jurisdiction.  They may also choose between the state and 
federal courts, assuming that the matter implicates a federal question, 
meets the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, or otherwise 
qualifies for hearing in a federal court. 
Criminal prosecutions are also portable.  In a case involving 
interstate criminal activity, prosecutors can elect to file charges in one 
or more of the states in which the acts occurred, or prosecutors may 
file charges in federal court.  Even purely intrastate crimes, such as 
drug and gun offenses, are potentially subject to dual federal and state 
jurisdiction.  The U.S. Code has criminalized over 4500 offenses, and 
it overlaps significantly with state criminal codes.159 
The potential to file in many different fora naturally invites “forum 
shopping”—i.e., the comparison of advantages and disadvantages that 
each jurisdiction might offer.  If evidence rules vary significantly 
between jurisdictions, these differences might become a factor in the 
selection of a forum.160  There is usually no practical remedy for the 
party aggrieved by an opponent’s forum shopping, although some 
courts have listed forum shopping among the factors that might 
support abstention.161 
Forum shopping is objectionable for a number of reasons.  It could 
require defendants to appear in faraway jurisdictions.  It allows the 
plaintiff or prosecutor to select the very most favorable system of 
rules.  It erodes public confidence in the judicial system because the 
party on offense gets to “customize” the set of rules according to that 
party’s liking. 
 
159 E.g., Lindsey C. Boney IV, Forum Shopping Through the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 60 ALA. L. REV. 151, 188–89 (2008) (noting that differences in evidence law 
and other procedural rules lead to forum shopping). 
160 Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 21 
(2010) (“Congress has slowly but surely obtained a general police power to enact virtually 
any offense, adopted repetitive and overlapping statutes, criminalized behavior that is 
already well covered by state law, created a vast web of regulatory offenses, and extended 
federal jurisdiction to almost any sort of deception or wrongdoing, virtually anywhere in 
the world.  At last count, there were about 4500 federal crimes on the books, with the 
largest portion enacted over the past four decades.”). 
161 Anthony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 188 
(2000) (noting that forum shopping or “rule-of-evidence shopping” might be a factor 
influencing a court’s decision to abstain). 
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Uniform rules reduce the opportunities for forum shopping.  While 
other reforms might also be helpful—e.g., the curtailment of 
overlapping substantive jurisdiction and the limitation of prosecutors’ 
discretion to file charges wherever they please—the standardization 
of procedural rules such as evidence codes will be a crucial part of the 
campaign to reduce forum shopping. 
E.  Significant Changes to the Substance of the OEC 
One additional advantage of adopting the restyled FRE is that 
Oregon could copy a few federal rules that are substantively different 
from, and superior to, their counterparts in Oregon.  The restyling 
project did not change the substance of these rules, but the states’ 
review of the restyled FRE provides an excuse to consider substantive 
differences between the FRE and OEC that predated the restyling. 
Oregon should consider importing two federal rules that are 
substantively different from their counterparts in the OEC.  The first 
is FRE 608(b).  That rule allows impeachment with specific 
unconvicted acts that bear on character for truthfulness—either acts 
by the witness himself or by another about whom the witness has 
given opinion or reputation evidence inconsistent with the specific 
acts.162  FRE 608(b) requires the impeaching attorney to take the 
answer of the witness, rather than proving up the acts by extrinsic 
evidence.163  OEC 608(2) is far more restrictive than FRE 608(b).  
Oregon’s rule not only bans extrinsic evidence of specific 
unconvicted acts but also prohibits the impeaching attorney from 
inquiring at all about such acts on cross-examination.164  This 
 
162 The restyled version of FRE 608(b) provides as follows: 
(B) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT.  Except for a criminal conviction under 
Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a 
witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for 
truthfulness.  But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired 
into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: 
(1) the witness; or 
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has 
testified about. 
163 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
164 OEC 608(2) provides as follows: “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for 
the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility of the witness, other than conviction 
of a crime as provided in ORS 40.355, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.  Further, 
such specific instances of conduct may not, even if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness.”  OR. EVID. CODE 
608(2). 
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limitation is inconsistent with Oregon’s general preference for 
rigorous confrontation and cross-examination.165  OEC 608(2) also 
undermines the OEC’s goal of promoting candor in court because 
witnesses can give general opinion and reputation evidence without 
any accountability when the specific facts contradict these 
generalizations.166  Oregon made a mistake in adopting its unique 
version of OEC 608(2) back in 1981, and the restyled version of FRE 
608(b) would fit better in the overall schedule of the OEC at the 
present time. 
A second federal rule that presents substantive advantages over its 
Oregon counterpart is FRE 609(a).  This rule sets forth the procedure 
for impeaching witnesses with evidence of convictions that bear on 
character for truthfulness.167  Until 2001, Oregon adhered to the 
federal model, permitting impeachment with felonies and 
misdemeanor crimes involving dishonesty and false statements.  In 
2001, the Oregon Legislature added a third category of crimes to the 
list of impeachable offenses under OEC 609.  When a defendant is 
prosecuted for certain crimes of violence against a family or 
household member, and when that defendant elects to testify, the 
prosecutor may impeach the defendant with a prior misdemeanor 
conviction for a crime involving assault, menacing, or harassment of a 
family or household member.168  Oregon is the only state in the 
 
165 See supra Part II.A. 
166 See supra Part II.D. 
167 The restyled version of FRE 609(a) provides as follows: 
(a) IN GENERAL.  The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character 
for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction: 
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death 
or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence: 
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the witness is not a 
defendant in a criminal case; and 
(B) must be admitted if the witness is a defendant in a criminal case 
and the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect; and 
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be 
admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements 
of the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest 
act or false statement. 
168 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  OEC 609(2)(a), the provision that admits 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence in order to impeach the accused, does not 
include any requirement that the crimes must have involved dishonesty.  OR. EVID. CODE 
609(2)(a).  The only requirement is that the crimes must be similar to the presently 
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nation that allows such impeachment under its version of Rule 609.  
The prior commission of misdemeanor crimes involving violence has 
little bearing on the tendency of a witness to lie on the stand.  
Oregon’s zeal for the prosecution of domestic violence169 is 
misplaced in OEC 609.  The time has come to adopt the federal 
version of this rule. 
IV 
DISADVANTAGES OF ADOPTING THE NEW FRE IN OREGON 
Notwithstanding the considerations explored in Part III, wholesale 
adoption of the restyled FRE in Oregon would be detrimental for at 
least three reasons.  First, Oregon would lose the unique evidentiary 
rules that it has crafted over the last four decades; most of these rules 
are well suited to the peculiar culture and constitutional law in this 
state.  Second, if Oregon completely discarded the OEC, this state 
would lose the benefit of appellate case law that has interpreted the 
OEC since 1981.  Third, the adoption of the FRE in Oregon might 
stultify innovation, and it might necessitate that Oregon march in 
lockstep with other jurisdictions that adhere closely to the FRE.  The 
following subparts discuss each of these considerations in turn. 
A.  Loss of Unique Substantive Rules 
With the exception of OEC 608(b) and 609(a), discussed in Part 
III.A above, the OEC is a good fit for this state, at least on a 
substantive level.  The rules mirror the unique culture of Oregon.  
This state values accountability, so confrontation takes on a greater 
significance in the OEC than in the FRE.  Oregon values privacy, so 
the OEC carefully protects the secrets of parties and lawyers.  Oregon 
has great faith in juries, so the OEC shows juries a wider range of 
evidence than federal juries can see.  Oregon insists upon honesty and 
fair play, so the OEC imposes strict penalties for gamesmanship in 
litigation.  Oregon regards violence against women and children as an 
urgent problem, so the OEC includes several customized provisions 
designed to facilitate prosecutions of these crimes.  Simply put, the 
restyled FRE do not match the values and culture of this state as well 
as the OEC. 
 
charged offense.  Under the guise of impeachment, OEC 609(2) explores the propensity of 
the accused to commit crimes of domestic violence. 
169 See supra Part II.E. 
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Aside from such policy concerns, the restyled FRE do not align 
well with the contours of the Oregon Constitution.  Oregon’s 
confrontation clause is more demanding than its federal counterpart.  
The OEC demands more confrontation than the FRE because the 
Oregon Constitution demands it.  The OEC also admits a wider range 
of hearsay because the confrontation requirements under Article 1, 
section 11 of the Oregon Constitution provide a backstop to the 
statutory regulation of the OEC.  The symbiotic relationship between 
the Oregon Constitution and the OEC is evident in other contexts.  
Article 1, section 9 protects privacy as strictly as the OEC’s privilege 
rules.  Article 1, section 17 insists on jury trials with the same ardor 
that OEC 404(4) insists on showing juries all relevant evidence. 
Given this state’s unique policy concerns and constitutional 
framework—not to mention Oregon’s fierce sense of independence—
the wholesale importation of the restyled FRE into the OEC seems 
inconceivable.  A more plausible alternative would be for Oregon to 
adopt the restyled versions of those federal rules that Oregon had 
already adopted before the restyling project.  Part V of this essay 
offers a list of particular provisions in the restyled FRE that Oregon 
should adopt because they comport with the policy goals and 
constitutional foundations of the OEC. 
B.  Confusion in Applying Old Case Law 
If Oregon were to overhaul the OEC to match the FRE, appellate 
decisions interpreting the old versions of Oregon rules could lose their 
force.  Ironically, the improvement of the evidentiary rules would 
come at the cost of losing three decades’ worth of interpretive 
decisions.  Oregon’s appellate courts infrequently issue opinions 
interpreting Oregon’s evidentiary rules, so it might take decades for 
these courts to replace their existing precedents with new opinions 
interpreting the revised rules. 
This cost is too high.  The Oregon Legislature should take care to 
memorialize when a new rule is substantively identical to its 
predecessor.  Oregon chose not to adopt any of the FRE’s 
commentary back in 1981, but now commentary is crucial.  Every 
time the commentary to the revised OEC makes clear that new rules 
track the old, the case law predating the amendments will remain 
persuasive. 
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C.  Ossification of the OEC 
Some critics fear that adoption of a uniform code will stultify 
innovation in the future.170  According to this view, the states are 
valuable “laboratories” in which to experiment with new evidentiary 
rules.  Once the states adopt a national template, they may become 
more reluctant to depart from that template.171 
This concern might make sense in another state, but Oregonians 
feel little compunction about coloring outside the lines.  One 
encouraging example is Oregon’s adoption of the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct in 2004.  At the time of the initial adoption, 
Oregon emulated the style of the ABA version but preserved, in large 
part, the substance of the preexisting Oregon rules.  Thereafter, 
Oregon made several revisions to the ABA template, virtually on an 
annual basis.172  Oregon’s ethical code remains a dynamic document, 
and there is no reason to expect that Oregon’s evidentiary rules would 
fare differently if Oregon were to adopt the restyled FRE. 
V 
PROPOSAL: SELECTIVE ADOPTION OF THE RESTYLED FRE 
The most prudent course for Oregon would be to adopt most, but 
not all, of the restyled FRE.  Oregon should adopt any restyled federal 
rule that replaces a prior federal rule that Oregon adopted wholesale.  
In other words, if a comparison of an Oregon evidentiary rule to a 
federal evidentiary rule revealed no substantive differences in 2010, 
then Oregon should adopt the restyled version of that rule. 
Oregon should not, however, replace the following rules in the 
Oregon Evidence Code: OEC 309 and 311 (governing presumptions), 
OEC 404 and 404-1 (governing the use of uncharged misconduct), 
OEC 412 (rape shield), OEC 503–13 (privileges), OEC 614 (setting 
forth the procedure for Oregon courts to call and interrogate 
witnesses), OEC 704 (allowing experts to testify regarding the mental 
 
170 See generally Kirgis, supra note 14, at 837–38 (discussing the tendency of uniform 
rules to become obsolete due to “legislative inertia”). 
171 See Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 
178 (2007) (commenting that, with respect to the restyled Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, “adoption of the restyled rules may make it harder for more substantial reform 
to be made”). 
172 The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct reflect the date on which amendments 
take effect.  Many amendments postdated the adoption of these rules in 2004.  OR. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2010), available at http://www.osbar.org/_docs/rulesregs/orpc.pdf. 
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state of the accused), OEC 801 (setting forth Oregon’s unique 
definition of hearsay), and OEC 803 and 804 (setting forth Oregon’s 
unique hearsay exceptions).  These rules comport with Oregon’s 
distinctive legal and cultural history.  Oregon has made a deliberate 
choice not to follow the federal template as to these rules, and the 
stylistic revision of the federal template does not necessitate that 
Oregon revisit its choice regarding the substance of these rules. 
Oregon should change two of its rules that currently diverge from 
the federal versions.  OEC 608 and 609 are inferior to their federal 
counterparts.  OEC 608 forbids Oregon attorneys from eliciting 
intrinsic evidence of unconvicted acts bearing on untruthfulness.173  
This provision limits the cross-examination and confrontation that 
Oregon values so much in other contexts.  Further, given the decline 
in resources for criminal prosecution in this state, the lack of a 
conviction is not necessarily a sign that the unconvicted conduct is 
innocent. 
In prosecutions of domestic violence, OEC 609 allows the 
government to impeach the defendant with evidence of his prior 
domestic violence, including misdemeanors.174  This rule is unwise.  
Prior misdemeanors that consist solely of violent acts (as opposed to 
deceitful acts) are not automatically probative of truthfulness.  Such 
evidence might be useful in showing the defendant’s character for 
violence, but OEC 404-1 already permits this use of the evidence 
without resort to OEC 609.175  There is no compelling reason why 
defendants accused of domestic violence should be more vulnerable 
to impeachment on grounds of truthfulness than defendants accused 
of other serious crimes, such as murder of a victim who is not an 
intimate partner. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several compelling reasons for Oregon to incorporate 
most of the new changes to the FRE.  The restyling of the FRE will 
improve accessibility, will reduce forum shopping, will enhance the 
predictability of judicial rulings, and will facilitate interstate 
commerce by promoting consistency in litigation procedures.  Just as 
simplicity and uniformity are valuable in other states, they would be 
salutary in Oregon.  This state should promptly adopt the restyled 
 
173 OR. EVID. CODE 608(2). 
174 OR. EVID. CODE 609(2). 
175 See OR. EVID. CODE 404-1. 
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versions of any rules in the OEC that presently mirror their federal 
counterparts. 
Most of Oregon’s unique evidentiary rules, however, should 
survive the restyling process.  After all, the purpose of restyling was 
not to change the substance of any evidence code.  Oregon attorneys 
and judges have become accustomed to this state’s distinctive 
evidence rules, and dramatic changes to the rules would bring 
confusion rather than clarity.  While Oregon should end its misguided 
experiments with OEC 608 and 609, most of Oregon’s unique rules 
suit this state well. 
 
